Athenagoras
[an early Christian] was an Ante-Nicene Christian apologist who lived during the second half of the
2nd century of whom little is known for certain, besides that he was Athenian,
a philosopher, and a convert to Christianity.
BY the side
of every opinion and doctrine which agrees with the truth of things, there
springs up some falsehood; and it does so, not because it takes its rise
naturally from some fundamental principle, or from some cause peculiar to the
matter in hand, but because it is invented on purpose by men who set a value on
the spurious seed, for its tendency to corrupt the truth. 1
For he who is
ignorant of anything that requires to be done, is utterly unable either to
attempt or to do what he is ignorant of; and he, too, who knows ever so well
what has to be done, and by what means, and how, but either has no power at all
to do the thing known, or not power sufficient, will not even make the attempt,
if he be wise and consider his powers; and if he did attempt it without due consideration,
he would not accomplish his purpose. But it is not possible for God to be
ignorant, either of the nature of the bodies that are to be raised, as regards
both the members entire and the particles of which they consist, or whither
each of the dissolved particles passes, and what part of the elements has
received that which is dissolved and has passed into that with which it has
affinity, although to men it may appear quite impossible that what has again
combined according to its nature with the universe should be separable from it
again. For He from whom, antecedently to the peculiar formation of each, was
not concealed either the nature of the elements of which the bodies of men were
to consist, or the parts of these from which He was about to take what seemed
to Him suitable for the formation of the human body, will manifestly, after the
dissolution of the whole, not be ignorant whither each of the particles has
passed which He took for the construction of each. 2
Moreover
also, that His power is sufficient for the raising of dead bodies, is shown by
the creation of these same bodies. For if, when they did not exist, He made at
their first formation the bodies of men, and their original elements, He will,
when they are dissolved, in whatever manner that may take place, raise them
again with equal ease: for this, too, is equally possible to Him. And it is no
damage to the argument, if some suppose the first beginnings to be from matter,
or the bodies of men at least to be derived from the elements as the first
materials, or from seed. For that power which could give shape to what is
regarded by them as shapeless matter, and adorn it, when destitute of form and
order, with many and diverse forms, and gather into one the several portions of
the elements, and divide the seed which was one and simple into many, and
organize that which was unorganized, and give life to that which had no
life,—that same power can reunite what is dissolved, and raise up what is
prostrate, and restore the dead to life again, and put the corruptible into a
state of incorruption. And to the same Being it will belong, and to the same
power and skill, to separate that which has been broken up and distributed
among a multitude of animals of all kinds which are wont to have recourse to
such bodies, and glut their appetite upon them,—to separate this, I say, and
unite it again with the proper members and parts of members, whether it has
passed into some one of those animals, or into many, or thence into others, or,
after being dissolved along with these, has been carried back again to the
original elements, resolved into these according to a natural law—a matter this
which seems to have exceedingly confounded some, even of those admired for
wisdom, who, I cannot tell why, think those doubts worthy of serious attention
which are brought forward by the many. 3
As there are
many things of more importance to the inquiry before us, I beg to be excused
from replying for the present to those who take refuge in the works of men, and
even the constructors of them, who are unable to make anew such of their works
as are broken in pieces, or worn out by time, or otherwise destroyed, and then
from the analogy of potters and carpenters attempt to show that God neither can
will, nor if He willed would be able, to raise again a body that is dead, or
has been dissolved,—not considering that by such reasoning they offer the
grossest insult to God, putting, as they do, on the same level the capabilities
of things which are altogether different, or rather the natures of those who
use them, and comparing the works of art with those of nature. To bestow any
serious attention on such arguments would be not undeserving of censure, for it
is really foolish to reply to superficial and trifling objections. It is surely
far more probable, yea, most absolutely true, to say that what is impossible
with men is possible with God. And if by this statement of itself as probable,
and by the whole investigation in which we have just been engaged reason shows
it to be possible, it is quite clear that it is not impossible. No, nor is it
such a thing as God could not will. 9
The argument
from the cause will appear, if we consider whether man was made at random and
in vain, or for some purpose; and if for some purpose, whether simply that he
might live and continue in the natural condition in which he was created, or
for the use of another; and if with a view to use, whether for that of the
Creator Himself, or of some one of the beings who belong to Him, and are by Him
deemed worthy of greater care. Now, if we consider this in the most general way,
we find that a person of sound mind, and who is moved by a rational judgment to
do anything, does nothing in vain which he does intentionally, but either for
his own use, or for the use of some other person for whom he cares, or for the
sake of the work itself, being moved by some natural inclination and affection
towards its production. 12
For to
creeping things, I suppose, and birds, and fishes, or, to speak more generally,
all irrational creatures, God has assigned such a life as that; but to those
who bear upon them the image of the Creator Himself, and are endowed with
understanding, and blessed with a rational judgment, the Creator has assigned
perpetual duration, in order that, recognising their own Maker, and His power
and skill, and obeying law and justice, they may pass their whole existence
free from suffering, in the possession of those qualities with which they have bravely
borne their preceding life, although they lived in corruptible and earthly
bodies. 12
For many, in
discussing the subject of the resurrection, have rested the whole cause on the
third argument alone, deeming that the cause of the resurrection is the
judgment. But the fallacy of this is very clearly shown, from the fact that,
although all human beings who die rise again, yet not all who rise again are to
be judged: for if only a just judgment were the cause of the resurrection, it
would of course follow that those who had done neither evil nor good—namely, very
young children—would not rise again; but seeing that all are to rise again,
those who have died in infancy as well as others, they too justify our
conclusion that the resurrection takes place not for the sake of the judgment
as the primary reason, but in consequence of the purpose of God in forming men,
and the nature of the beings so formed.
14
And if both
understanding and reason have been given to men for the discernment of things
which are perceived by the understanding, and not of existences only, but also
of the goodness and wisdom and rectitude of their Giver, it necessarily follows
that, since those things continue for the sake of which the rational judgment
is given, the judgment given for these things should also continue. But it is
impossible for this to continue, unless the nature which has received it, and
in which it adheres, continues. But that which has received both understanding
and reason is man, not the soul by itself. Man, therefore, who consists of the
two parts, must continue for ever. But it is impossible for him to continue
unless he rise again. For if no resurrection were to take place, the nature of
men as men would not continue. And if the nature of men does not continue, in
vain has the soul been fitted to the need of the body and to its experiences;
in vain has the body been fettered so that it cannot obtain what it longs for, obedient
to the reins of the soul, and guided by it as with a bridle; in vain is the
understanding, in vain is wisdom, and the observance of rectitude, or even the
practice of every virtue, and the enactment and enforcement of laws,—to say all
in a word, whatever is noble in men or for men’s sake, or rather the very
creation and nature of men. But if vanity is utterly excluded from all the works
of God, and from all the gifts bestowed by Him, the conclusion is unavoidable,
that, along with the interminable duration of the soul, there will be a
perpetual continuance of the body according to its proper nature. 15
The
arguments I just now proposed for examination, as establishing the truth of the
resurrection, are all of the same kind, since they all start from the same
point; for their starting-point is the origin of the first men by creation. But
while some of them derive their strength from the starting-point itself from
which they take their rise, others, consequent upon the nature and the life of
men, acquire their credibility from the superintendence of God over us; for the
cause according to which, and on account of which, men have come into being,
being closely connected with the nature of men, derives its force from
creation; but the argument from rectitude, which represents God as judging men
according as they have lived well or ill, derives its force from the end of
their existence: they come into being on the former ground, but their state
depends more on God’s superintendence. And now that the matters which come
first have been demonstrated by me to the best of my ability, it will be well
to prove our proposition by those also which come after—I mean by the reward or
punishment due to each man in accordance with righteous judgment, and by the
final cause of human existence; and of these I put foremost that which takes
the lead by nature, and inquire first into the argument relating to the
judgment: premising only one thing, from concern for the principle which
appertains to the matters before us, and for order—namely, that it is incumbent
on those who admit God to be the Maker of this universe, to ascribe to His
wisdom and rectitude the preservation and care of all that has been created, if
they wish to keep to their own principles; and with such views to hold that
nothing either in earth or in heaven is without guardianship or providence, but
that, on the contrary, to everything, invisible and visible alike, small and
great, the attention of the Creator reaches; for all created things require the
attention of the Creator, and each one in particular, according to its nature
and the end for which it was made: though I think it would be a useless
expenditure of trouble to go through the list now, or distinguish between the several
cases, or mention in detail what is suitable to each nature. Man, at all
events, of whom it is now our business to speak, as being in want, requires
food; as being mortal, posterity; as being rational, a process of judgment. But
if each of these things belongs to man by nature, and he requires food for his
life, and requires posterity for the continuance of the race, and requires a
judgment in order that food and posterity may be according to law, it of course
follows, since food and posterity refer to both together, that the judgment
must be referred to them too (by both together I mean man, consisting of soul
and body), and that such man becomes accountable for all his actions, and
receives for them either reward or punishment. Now, if the righteous judgment
awards to both together its retribution for the deeds wrought; and if it is not
proper that either the soul alone should receive the wages of the deeds wrought
in union with the body (for this of itself has no inclination to the faults
which are committed in connection with the pleasure or food and culture of the
body), or that the body alone should (for this of itself is incapable of
distinguishing law and justice), but man, composed of these, is subjected to
trial for each of the deeds wrought by him; and if reason does not find this
happening either in this life (for the award according to merit finds no place
in the present existence, since many atheists and persons who practice every
iniquity and wickedness live on to the last, unvisited by calamity, whilst, on
the contrary, those who have manifestly lived an exemplary life in respect of
every virtue, live in pain, in insult, in calumny and outrage, and suffering of
all kinds) or after death (for both together no longer exist, the soul being
separated from the body, and the body itself being resolved again into the
materials out of which it was composed, and no longer retaining anything of its
former structure or form, much less the remembrance of its actions): the result
of all this is very plain to every one,—namely, that, in the language of the
apostle, “this corruptible (and dissoluble) must put on incorruption,” in order
that those who were dead, having been made alive by the resurrection, and the
parts that were separated and entirely dissolved having been again united, each
one may, in accordance with justice, receive what he has done by the body,
whether it be good or bad. 18
In replying,
then, to those who acknowledge a divine superintendence, and admit the same principles
as we do, yet somehow depart from their own admissions, one may use such
arguments as those which have been adduced, and many more than these, should he
be disposed to amplify what has been said only concisely and in a cursory
manner. But in dealing with those who differ from us concerning primary truths,
it will perhaps be well to lay down another principle antecedent to these,
joining with them in doubting of the things to which their opinions relate, and
examining the matter along with them in this manner—whether the life of men,
and their entire course of existence, is overlooked, and a sort of dense
darkness is poured down upon the earth, hiding in ignorance and silence both
the men themselves and their actions; or whether it is much safer to be of
opinion that the Maker presides over the things which He Himself has made,
inspecting all things whatsoever which exist, or come into existence, Judge of
both deeds and purposes. For if no judgment whatever were to be passed on the
actions of men, men would have no advantage over the irrational creatures, but
rather would fare worse than these do, inasmuch as they keep in subjection
their passions, and concern themselves about piety, and righteousness, and the
other virtues; and a life after the manner of brutes would be the best, virtue
would be absurd, the threat of judgment a matter for broad laughter, indulgence
in every kind of pleasure the highest good, and the common resolve of all these
and their one law would be that maxim, so dear to the intemperate and lewd,
“Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.” For the termination of such a
life is not even pleasure, as some suppose, but utter insensibility. But if the
Maker of men takes any concern about His own works, and the distinction is
anywhere to be found between those who have lived well and ill, it must be
either in the present life, while men are still living who have conducted themselves
virtuously or viciously, or after death, when men are in a state of separation
and dissolution. But according to neither of these suppositions can we find a
just judgment taking place; for neither do the good in the present life obtain
the rewards of virtue, nor yet do the bad receive the wages of vice. I pass
over the fact, that so long as the nature we at present possess is preserved, the
moral nature is not able to bear a punishment commensurate with the more
numerous or more serious faults. For the robber, or ruler, or tyrant, who has
unjustly put to death myriads on myriads, could not by one death make
restitution for these deeds; and the man who holds no true opinion concerning
God, but lives in all outrage and blasphemy, despises divine things, breaks the
laws, commits outrage against boys and women alike, razes cities unjustly,
burns houses with their inhabitants, and devastates a country, and at the same
time destroys inhabitants of cities and peoples, and even an entire nation—how
in a mortal body could he endure a penalty adequate to these crimes, since
death prevents the deserved punishment, and the mortal nature does not suffice
for any single one of his deeds? It is proved, therefore, that neither in the
present life is there a judgment according to men’s deserts, nor after death. 19
For either
death is the entire extinction of life, the soul being dissolved and corrupted
along with the body, or the soul remains by itself, incapable of dissolution,
of dispersion, of corruption, whilst the body is corrupted and dissolved,
retaining no longer any remembrance of past actions, nor sense of what it
experienced in connection with the soul. If the life of men is to be utterly extinguished,
it is manifest there will be no care for men who are not living, no judgment
respecting those who have lived in virtue or in vice; but there will rush in
again upon us whatever belongs to a lawless life, and the swarm of absurdities
which follow from it, and that which is the summit of this lawlessness—atheism.
But if the body were to be corrupted, and each of the dissolved particles to
pass to its kindred element, yet the soul to remain by itself as immortal,
neither on this supposition would any judgment on the soul take place, since
there would be an absence of equity: for it is unlawful to suspect that any
judgment can proceed out of God and from God which is wanting in equity. Yet
equity is wanting to the judgment, if the being is not preserved in
existence who practiced righteousness or lawlessness: for that which practiced
each of the things in life on which the judgment is passed was man, not soul by
itself. To sum up all in a word, this view will in no case consist with equity. 20
For if good
deeds are rewarded, the body will clearly be wronged, inasmuch as it has shared
with the soul in the toils connected with well-doing, but does not share in the
reward of the good deeds, and because, though the soul is often excused for
certain faults on the ground of the body’s neediness and want, the body itself
is deprived of all share in the good deeds done, the toils on behalf of which
it helped to bear during life. Nor, again, if faults are judged, is the soul
dealt fairly with, supposing it alone to pay the penalty for the faults it
committed through being solicited by the body and drawn away by it to its own
appetites and motions, at one time being seized upon and carried off, at
another attracted in some very violent manner, and sometimes concurring with it
by way of kindness and attention to its preservation. How can it possibly be
other than unjust for the soul to be judged by itself in respect of things
towards which in its own nature it feels no appetite, no motion, no impulse,
such as licentiousness, violence, covetousness, injustice, and the unjust acts arising
out of these? For if the majority of such evils come from men’s not having the
mastery of the passions which solicit them, and they are solicited by the
neediness and want of the body, and the care and attention required by it (for
these are the motives for every acquisition of property, and especially for the
using of it, and moreover for marriage and all the actions of life, in which things,
and in connection with which, is seen what is faulty and what is not so), how
can it be just for the soul alone to be judged in respect of those things which
the body is the first to be sensible of, and in which it draws the soul away to
sympathy and participation in actions with a view to things which it wants; and
that the appetites and pleasures, and moreover the fears and sorrows, in which
whatever exceeds the proper bounds is amenable to judgment, should be set in
motion by the body, and yet that the sins arising from these, and the
punishments for the sins committed, should fall upon the soul alone, which
neither needs anything of this sort, nor desires nor fears or suffers of itself
any such thing as man is wont to suffer? But even if we hold that these
affections do not pertain to the body alone, but to man, in saying which we
should speak correctly, because the life of man is one, though composed of the
two, yet surely we shall not assert that these things belong to the soul, if we
only look simply at its peculiar nature. For if it is absolutely without need of
food, it can never desire those things which it does not in the least require
for its subsistence; nor can it feel any impulse towards any of those things
which it is not at all fitted to use; nor, again, can it be grieved at the want
of money or other property, since these are not suited to it. And if, too, it
is superior to corruption, it fears nothing whatever as destructive of itself:
it has no dread of famine, or disease, or mutilation, or blemish, or fire, or
sword, since it cannot suffer from any of these any hurt or pain, because
neither bodies nor bodily powers touch it at all. But if it is absurd to attach
the passions to the soul as belonging specially to it, it is in the highest
degree unjust and unworthy of the judgment of God to lay upon the soul alone
the sins which spring from them, and the consequent punishments. 21
In addition
to what has been said, is it not absurd that, while we cannot even have the
notion of virtue and vice as existing separately in the soul (for we recognise
the virtues as man’s virtues, even as in like manner vice, their opposite, as
not belonging to the soul in separation from the body, and existing by itself),
yet that the reward or punishment for these should be assigned to the soul alone?
How can any one have even the notion of courage or fortitude as existing in the
soul alone, when it has no fear of death, or wounds, or maiming, or loss, or
maltreatment, or of the pain connected with these, or the suffering resulting
from them? And what shall we say of self-control and temperance, when there is
no desire drawing it to food or sexual intercourse, or other pleasures and
enjoyments, nor any other thing soliciting it from within or exciting it from
without? And what of practical wisdom, when things are not proposed to it which
may or may not be done, nor things to be chosen or avoided, or rather when
there is in it no motion at all or natural impulse towards the doing of
anything? And how in any sense can equity be an attribute of souls, either in
reference to one another or to anything else, whether of the same or of a
different kind, when they are not able from any source, or by any means, or in
any way, to bestow that which is equal according to merit or according to analogy,
with the exception of the honour rendered to God, and, moreover, have no
impulse or motion towards the use of their own things, or abstinence from those
of others, since the use of those things which are according to nature, or the
abstinence from them, is considered in reference to those who are so
constituted as to use them, whereas the soul neither wants anything, nor is so
constituted as to use any things or any single thing, and therefore what is
called the independent action of the parts cannot be found in the soul so
constituted? 22
But the most
irrational thing of all is this: to impose properly sanctioned laws on men, and
then to assign to their souls alone the recompense of their lawful or unlawful
deeds. For if he who receives the laws would also justly receive the recompense
of the transgression of the laws, and if it was man that received the laws, and
not the soul by itself, man must also bear the recompense for the sins
committed, and not the soul by itself, since God has not enjoined on souls to
abstain from things which have no relation to them, such as adultery, murder,
theft, rapine, dishonour to parents, and every desire in general that tends to
the injury and loss of our neighbours. For neither the command, “Honour thy
father and thy mother,” is adapted to souls alone, since such names are not
applicable to them, for souls do not produce souls, so as to appropriate the
appellation of father or mother, but men produce men; nor could the command,
“Thou shalt not commit adultery,” ever be properly addressed to souls, or even
thought of in such a connection, since the difference of male and female does
not exist in them, nor any aptitude for sexual intercourse, nor appetite for
it; and where there is no appetite, there can be no intercourse; and where
there is no intercourse at all, there can be no legitimate intercourse, namely
marriage; and where there is no lawful intercourse, neither can there be
unlawful desire of, or intercourse with, another man’s wife, namely adultery. Nor,
again, is the prohibition of theft, or of the desire of having more, applicable
to souls, for they do not need those things, through the need of which, by
reason of natural indigence or want, men are accustomed to steal or to rob,
such as gold, or silver, or an animal, or something else adapted for food, or
shelter, or use; for to an immortal nature everything which is desired by the
needy as useful is useless. 23
The points
proposed for consideration having been to some extent investigated, it remains
to examine the argument from the end or final cause, which indeed has already
emerged in what has been said, and only requires just so much attention and
further discussion as may enable us to avoid the appearance of leaving
unmentioned any of the matters briefly referred to by us, and thus indirectly damaging
the subject or the division of topics made at the outset. For the sake of those
present, therefore, and of others who may pay attention to this subject, it may
be well just to signify that each of those things which are constituted by
nature, and of those which are made by art, must have an end peculiar to
itself, as indeed is taught us by the common sense of all men, and testified by
the things that pass before our eyes. For do we not see that husbandmen have
one end, and physicians another; and again, the things which spring out of the
earth another, and the animals nourished upon it, and produced according to a
certain natural series, another? If this is evident, and natural and artificial
powers, and the actions arising from these, must by all means be accompanied by
an end in accordance with nature, it is absolutely necessary that the end of
men, since it is that of a peculiar nature, should be separated from community
with the rest; for it is not lawful to suppose the same end for beings
destitute of rational judgment, and of those whose actions are regulated by the
innate law and reason, and who live an intelligent life and observe justice.
Freedom from pain, therefore, cannot be the proper end for the latter, for this
they would have in common with beings utterly devoid of sensibility: nor can it
consist in the enjoyment of things which nourish or delight the body, or in an
abundance of pleasures; else a life like that of the brutes must hold the first
place, while that regulated by virtue is without a final cause. For such an end
as this, I suppose, belongs to beasts and cattle, not to men possessed of an
immortal soul and rational judgment. 24
No comments:
Post a Comment
“Reason dictates that persons who are truly noble and who love wisdom will honor and love only what is true. They will refuse to follow traditional viewpoints if those viewpoints are worthless...Instead, a person who genuinely loves truth must choose to do and speak what is true, even if he is threatened with death...I have not come to flatter you by this written petition, nor to impress you by my words. I have come to simply beg that you do not pass judgment until you have made an accurate and thorough investigation. Your investigation must be free of prejudice, hearsay, and any desire to please the superstitious crowds. As for us, we are convinced that you can inflict no lasting evil on us. We can only do it to ourselves by proving to be wicked people. You can kill us—but you cannot harm us.” From Justin Martyr's first apology 150 A.D. Martyred A.D. 160